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IMPROVING THE ODDS:
BATTLEFIELD MEDICINE IN IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN
BY ROBERT BECKHUSEN

During the course of two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. militar y has faced challenges in
treating wounded soldiers on a scale it hasn’t witnessed since the Vietnam War. In response, the
militar y has succeeded in reducing the mor tality rate of soldiers injured in combat through a radical shift in doctrine, procedures and medical technology. The duration of the two wars has also
produced a wealth of research that has informed Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC), which
has become the standardized set of procedures used to treat U.S. casualties across active-duty
militar y services. Despite this, the cost has been high: 4,486 U.S. soldiers were killed in Iraq and
more than 2,300 killed in Afghanistan. In the early years of the conf licts, the rate of preventable
deaths was little different from 30 years prior. But more than a decade later, a wounded soldier is
much more likely to survive his or her injuries than in previous wars.
Par tly, this is due to the duration of the conf licts. Advances in medical technology and battlefield
care can be seen and studied over longer periods. Information technology has made it easier to
track, treat and analyze injuries. Developments in neuroscience and prosthetics have also opened
up new areas for long-term care, although the causes of traumatic brain injuries (TBI) remain elusive and treatment is often poor. Meanwhile, militar y practices are being widely adopted in civilian hospitals, by police and by first-responder paramedic teams, and institutions such as the U.S.
Army Institute for Surgical Research have also driven a wave of research into treating traumatic
injuries, to the benefit of civilian medical providers.
DEVELOPMENTS IN BATTLEFIELD TRAUMA CARE
In a battlefield environment, medics are expected to treat severe injuries with limited supplies in
dusty, dir ty environments while also risking being shot with bullets or wounded by shrapnel. This
confusing and hazardous environment poses enormous challenges not regularly faced by civilian
paramedics. Soldiers can sustain catastrophic injuries that can cause sudden death or life-long
disability. Does the medic prioritize treating injuries or fighting the enemy? When faced with
multiple injuries, how does the medic prioritize which injuries to treat first? And how does the
medic treat injuries when different types of treatment pose various other risks?
The most impor tant development in battlefield trauma care has been the creation of the set of
doctrines and procedures that comprise Tactical Combat Casualty Care. First developed beginning
in 1994 by the U.S. special operations forces community, the goal was to detect the most easily
preventable causes of battlefield deaths and train first responders to quickly stabilize such injuries
when under fire. This also meant defer ring care for injuries that, while still potentially lethal if
left untreated, were survivable in the shor t term. In 1997, TCCC became the standard doctrine for
the Navy SEALs, and was mandated for the U.S. 75th Ranger Regiment in 1998 by the regiment’s
commanding officer, then-Col. Stanley McChr ystal. In 2011, TCCC became the standardized set
of combat medical procedures used across the U.S. armed forces.
First, TCCC prioritizes reducing casualties over treatment. If a unit comes under attack and one
or more soldiers are wounded, the medic—and the injured, if possible—are tasked with returning
WPR | FIRST RESPONSE: HEALTH WORK IN CONFLICT ZONES 2014

4

This was a marked change from how the U.S. militar y treated casualties early on in America’s
21st-centur y wars. When the U.S. militar y first entered Afghanistan and Iraq, little had changed in
medical doctrine since the Vietnam War. Aside from a select few commando units with experience
in TCCC, such as the 75th Ranger Regiment—which saw a 3 percent casualty rate from potentially
survivable wounds in 2001-2010 compared to 24 percent across the general armed forces—and
Navy SEAL teams, the armed services did not train troops to use tourniquets, and in fact cautioned
against their use. This has long been a point of controversy among doctors. A tourniquet cuts off
the body’s blood supply to the wound, which reduces bleeding, but can also result in cut-off tissue becoming oxygenated, which can possibly lead to cell death, nerve damage and amputations.
Worse, clotting tissue can then spread to the bloodstream, potentially leading to shock and death.
Prior to the implementation of the TCCC, tourniquets were widely thought to be a cure worse than
the wound.
The risks of tourniquets are real, par ticularly if applied improperly or applied after a wounded soldier goes into shock. But as casualties mounted in Afghanistan and Iraq, a new consensus emerged
that the risks of using tourniquets had been overstated. A 2007 repor t by the U.S. Army Institute
for Surgical Research studied 232 soldiers in Iraq who had tourniquets applied to wounds and
found no link between tourniquets—if used cor rectly by trained personnel—and increased risk of
mor tality. The institute’s conclusion was that tourniquets can save lives and that discouraging their
use “in the cur rent war will increase the death rate.” Since these revelations, the U.S. militar y has
gone on to field more than 1 million Combat Application Tourniquets, which use a windlass to
secure the band tightly around an extremity, and require only one hand to use. Another development is the introduction to special operations forces units of a specialized tourniquet called the
Combat Ready Clamp, which attaches like a vice to the groin region—an area difficult to stabilize
with standard tourniquets.
The U.S. militar y has also improved upon several iterations of hemostatic dressings, which are
medical bandages containing chemicals that promote blood clotting. These dressings can be effective when applied together with tourniquets, and in regions that are not amenable to tourniquets
such as joints and armpits, which are frequent areas of combat wounds as they are not typically
covered by body armor. In 2003, the militar y largely used fibrin sealant dressings that contained
powdered fibrinogen and thrombin, which clotted wounds when pressed for two to three minutes.
Over the next several years, the militar y par tnered with the American Red Cross to produce dressings treated with chitosan, a chemical derived from shrimp. The U.S. militar y experimented with
a hemostatic agent known as QuikClot, but this was withdrawn after concerns that the powder
caused tissue burns and dissipated before forming a clot. Since 2008, the U.S. Army Institute of
Surgical Research has recommended Combat Gauze, a dressing coated in kaolin, a type of clay that
uses aluminosilicate nanopar ticles to stimulate clotting. It does not have any known side effects.
Another advance has been in treating hypothermia. Cold weather in Afghanistan’s mountains is a
common cause, but hypothermia can also be hastened by injecting cold intravenous f luids to stabilize wounded troops. The U.S. militar y has encouraged some makeshift alternatives, including
insulating intravenous tubes using bits of cloth, covering the tubes in a sleeping bag together with
the patient or storing the f luids close to the body, keeping them warm. Fur thermore, soldiers now
carry chemically heated blankets and hoods known as Hypothermia Prevention and Management Kits.
A related development was the establishment of the Depar tment of Defense Trauma Registr y. This
database, created in 2005, established a single system for tracking wounded soldiers and the type
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fire to suppress the enemy and stop the attack, depending on the tactical situation. This serves to
prevent the unit from incur ring fur ther casualties, including injuries to medical personnel on the
scene or those ar riving by helicopter to treat and evacuate the wounded. Next the doctrine calls on
medics to employ aggressive use of tourniquets and hemostatic agents to control bleeding, a form
of “damage control” that forgoes more complicated procedures, instead emphasizing procedures
that are likely to save lives in the hour before the wounded can reach a hospital.

DEVELOPMENTS IN FORWARD-DEPLOYED HOSPITAL CARE
Another series of improvements have occur red at in-theater hospitals and, to a lesser extent, during medevac f lights from the battlefield to the hospital.
In general, militar y medical evacuations during the wars compare poorly to their civilian counter par ts. U.S. Army medevac UH-60 Black Hawk and CH- 47 Chinook helicopters have commonly
car ried a single medic responsible for treating seriously injured patients while traveling over long
distances. By contrast, civilian helicopters often have two paramedics who are better trained and
equipped than their militar y counter par ts. According to a 2012 study in the Journal of Trauma and
Acute Care Surger y, the militar y version “remains essentially unchanged since the Vietnam era”
despite evidence showing that experiments with medevac units trained along civilian lines reduced
48-hour mor tality rates by 7 percent. However, the Pentagon has mandated all f light medics to
be trained to civilian paramedic standards by 2017. Medical evacuations have also become more
efficient. In 2009, then-Secretar y of Defense Rober t Gates surged helicopters into Afghanistan
to ensure that soldiers could make it to field hospitals within the “golden hour”—the hour after
sustaining an injur y in which, if treated, the patient is likely to survive. This decision is widely
credited with saving lives.
The militar y has been more innovative at field hospitals. One of the most serious issues facing
wounded troops is coagulopathy, a complex condition that prevents blood from clotting. According
to the Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surger y, a quar ter of combat casualties with severe bleeding experience the condition, with a mor tality rate up to 50 percent if treated with conventional
methods. In response, the militar y has reduced the mor tality rate of the wounded to 19 percent
by injecting casualties with equal ratios of red blood cells, frozen plasma and platelets. This has
meant forgoing substitutes such as cr yoprecipitate, which can cause side effects including transfusion-related acute lung injur y, which is potentially lethal. Militar y hospitals also now commonly
use tranexamic acid (TXA), which is used to control bleeding during intensive surgeries. Used in
civilian hospitals for decades, TXA was introduced to Afghanistan by British forces before entering regular service with U.S. forces.
Moreover, the U.S. has fielded medical-imaging CT machines at the Role 3 Multinational Medical
Unit in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the most advanced militar y medical facility in that countr y. Prior
to the introduction of CT scans at higher-echelon hospitals, the Pentagon mandated that surgeons
conduct invasive explorator y surgeries to discover shrapnel embedded by explosive blasts. That
mandate has since been dropped, which also eliminates the need for the now-unnecessar y surgeries, reducing the risk of fatal complications. The militar y has also deployed teams of specialized
vascular trauma surgeons—first introduced to in-theater hospitals in the past decade—in response
to data collected in the DOD Trauma Registr y that revealed injuries to veins and ar teries were
much more common than in previous wars.
One serious form of injur y frequently seen in militar y casualties is severe burns. These are commonly caused by explosive attacks on vehicles. A serious and potentially fatal complication occurs
when burn casualties are given too much saline f luid during resuscitation, which can cause pulmonar y edema and respirator y failure. This is also a common problem in the civilian world. In recent
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of treatment they receive once they ar rive at field hospitals. Such data continues to be tracked
as the soldiers are moved to more-advanced treatment facilities in the United States. This gave
Pentagon planners access to large amounts of data regarding which treatments were successful,
data they then used as the basis for recommendations to the U.S. militar y’s Center for Tactical
Combat Casualty Care. The program was later extended to include the Pre-Hospital Trauma Registr y Initiative, which tracks treatment given at the tactical level. As par t of the initiative, soldiers
are issued a card, and if a solider is injured, the field medic can write down the type of treatment
given before the casualty is evacuated. This essentially takes the militar y’s practice of recording
lessons learned from combat in the form of After Action Repor ts and applies it to casualties.

PROSPECTS AND SHORTFALLS FOR LONG-TERM CARE
However, despite these advances in battlefield care, the military’s record for long-term care is mixed.
Prosthetic legs have improved significantly in the past decade, essentially becoming computerized
limbs. At least 2,000 U.S. service members have lost limbs in America’s two wars. Many of these
veterans now use advanced prosthetics that include built-in gyroscopes and accelerometers that
can mimic leg muscles and adapt to changes in elevation. The limbs have also become lighter,
thanks to the use of carbon fiber str uctures as opposed to wood, which was used in prosthetics
during the Vietnam War. On the other hand, the more advanced prosthetic limbs on the market
such as the Otto Bock X-series—which began as a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) program—can be exceedingly expensive, at a cost of up to $100,000. Some components,
such as a knee with gyroscope and accelerometer, are commonly purchased separately to augment
an existing prosthetic leg.
It’s likely these advances will continue in the years ahead. DARPA is cur rently researching a program named Reliable Neural-Interface Technology, which aims to connect nerves in an amputated
limb to an interface, potentially allowing a veteran to manipulate a prosthetic arm using brain signals. Several prototypes are being used in militar y hospitals and include sensors in the finger tips
interfaced with the patient’s nervous system, which allows the patient to have limited sensations,
including feeling heat. However, it’s unclear if the interface will be able to perform well over a
period of several years—a problem that has plagued previous DARPA prosthetics experiments.
The militar y has also str uggled heavily with treating a surge of traumatic brain injuries. The wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in an estimated 200,000 brain injuries, often caused by
concussive blast waves from improvised explosive devices, grenades and controlled detonations.
The Pentagon has also been beset by numerous, well-documented scandals including widespread
neglect of soldiers with brain injuries at militar y hospitals, months-long delays before wounded
soldiers can receive treatment and soldiers being misdiagnosed and denied treatment. Militar y
hospitals can be poorly staffed, with soldiers diagnosed with mental illnesses tasked with overseeing other patients. The militar y has established mandator y TBI screening programs in the hope of
detecting cases, but many cases will likely never be adequately diagnosed and treated. Investigations of the militar y’s screening programs have found that their success rate of spotting TBI is
little better than random chance.
The problem is compounded by the fact that a TBI may simply go unnoticed. It may take years for
TBI symptoms to emerge, and these symptoms—including dizziness, nausea and headaches—can
var y drastically from person to person. New research from the Duke University School of Medicine
and the U.S. Depar tment of Veterans Affairs shows that soldiers who have been close to explosions
can have discernible injuries to the brain without showing any symptoms. But the science of TBI is
still poorly understood. Traumatic brain injur y is believed to be a trigger for post-traumatic stress
disorder, which can cause symptoms such as major depression and rage. But the exact relationship
is unclear. Worse, recognizing that problems with TBI are widespread could call soldiers away
from the battlefield, something the militar y is reluctant to do.
In addition, thousands of veterans have repor ted chronic respirator y problems as the result of
exposure to toxic par ticulates released from “burn pits”—or open-air incinerators—widely used
to dispose of waste at bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Pentagon has closed many of these pits,
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years, the militar y has tried to reduce this risk with a set of procedures adopted from civilian
hospitals known as the Rule of 10 and by recording the types and amounts of f luids administered,
which was not regularly done during the early years of the wars. Severe burns can also lead to kidney failure. Forward-deployed hospitals had few ways of treating this condition until 2005, when
the militar y began using a therapy known as continuous venovenous hemofiltration, a shor t-term
emergency dialysis treatment, until the patient could be f lown out of the countr y.

A silver lining to the conf licts has been the spread of militar y trauma practices to the civilian
world. The Pentagon shar ply increased funding for trauma research during the wars, and militar y
research institutions have collaborated heavily with their civilian counter par ts. After the April
15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombings, trauma treatment developed by the militar y was used to
control bleeding experienced by blast victims. Instead of giving patients whole blood, which risked
exhausting the supply, surgeons treating the injured from that incident used a militar y-style mix of
blood, plasma and platelets. The first responders also used tourniquets, again credited to the militar y, which resulted in no deaths from hemor rhage. Hemostatic dressings pioneered by the militar y
have become more common in civilian paramedic kits. Police first responders to the July 2012
mass shooting in Aurora, Colo., had been recently equipped with tourniquets and militar y-style
Combat Gauze, which was used to control bleeding of several victims. The new wave of advanced
prosthetics is also not limited to militar y amputees—civilians benefit as well. But TCCC cannot be
applied evenly across the civilian medical community, as many aspects relate to treating injuries
that are comparatively rare outside of battlefields.
Since its development, tactical care in the form of TCCC and its related technologies has improved
the survival rate for wounded soldiers. The doctrine was only mandated service-wide in 2011,
however, and it’s impor tant for the Pentagon to ensure militar y medical teams receive adequate
training under this standard. As U.S. forces withdraw from Afghanistan, it’s also cr ucial to prevent research into trauma from stagnating, as it did during the period after the Vietnam War. This
will not only have benefits for civilian providers, but there will likely be a time after Afghanistan
when U.S. and par tner forces will again be ordered into combat. When they are, they must receive
the best possible treatment. □
Robert Beckhusen is a reporter and editor at War is Boring, the national securit y collection at
Medium. He has also written for Wired, C4ISR Journal and other publications. You can f ind him
on Twitter at @rbeckhusen.
Photo: Flight medics f rom Task Force Knighthawk during a training course, Kandahar, Afghanistan, Jan. 4, 2013 (U. S. Army photo by Sgt. Luke Rollins).

WPR | FIRST RESPONSE: HEALTH WORK IN CONFLICT ZONES 2014

8

WPR FEATURE

which have been used to burn ever ything from discarded clothes to plastic and medical waste. The
vast majority of illnesses caused by exposure to hazardous chemicals will also likely never be fully
known, as the militar y did not keep records of the pits and what was burned in them until 2010.
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AID UNDER FIRE: HEALTH CARE AND
THE COSTS OF CONFLICT
BY HANNAH VAUGHAN-LEE

In recent years, the security threats facing humanitarian aid workers have been the subject of
headlines and debates. The humanitarian advocacy community has been filled with discussions of
a perceived increase in the politicization of humanitarian aid—attributed in par t to declining respect for the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impar tiality and independence—and
growing difficulties ensuring operations can be conducted in accordance with those principles.
These discussions frequently highlight attacks on relief personnel and assets to show that humanitarian workers are under attack. In the past year, the focus has nar rowed to a par ticular area of
humanitarian operations: medical and health care personnel and infrastr ucture. The image is of an
increasing vulnerability for health care providers in countries affected by conf lict.
The past year has seen a series of alarming repor ts on the dangers faced by health workers in some
countries. In nor thern Afghanistan, health workers were repor tedly in retreat after killings of aid
staff. In Pakistan, polio workers have been targeted with violence. And in Somalia, Medecins sans
Frontieres (MSF) withdrew citing violence against its staff.
Subsequent media coverage of these events has painted a picture of a global crisis in health care
assistance. Under the headline “Violent Attacks on Health Care Workers a Growing Problem,” one
writer asser ted that “recent repor ts of violence targeting health care workers provide evidence
that the prohibition of violence against health care workers has degraded.” Another insisted that
“as conf licts around the world multiply and drag on, the respect once accorded to humanitarian
workers is eroding. Medical personnel are par ticularly vulnerable.” Accordingly, the “international community” is called upon “to make violence against health care workers in conf lict zones
a priority.”
Despite the depiction of a growing crisis, historically, attacks on humanitarian workers and the
politicization of medical assistance in war zones are not new developments. Yet the media coverage of dead and injured medical relief workers, ambulance drivers and vaccination campaigners
appears to suggest that this practice is getting worse and that the “sanctity of the untouchable
status of health care” afforded to it under international humanitarian law “has been eroded, leaving medical workers increasingly vulnerable to attacks.”
In assessing the two aspects of this claim—violence and politicization—what becomes clear is
that the trend does appear to be worsening, but only in some contexts. Moreover, even for those
countries where targeted violence is rising, while the cause might be broadly attributed to politicization, how it manifests and the extent to which it represents a change varies. As such, available
information challenges suggestions of a global shift in the increasing risks and vulnerability of
health care workers. The underlying significance of attacks on health care workers and facilities,
targeted or otherwise, is not that they may violate the international protections or “sanctity”
afforded to medical assistance but the consequences such violence has for the conf lict-affected
populations. As such, this debate raises a more impor tant and much more complex question in
terms of global trends that requires greater attention: Are the costs of conf lict now greater for
affected populations, par ticularly when it comes to health?
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A recent article in the Lancet medical journal on the dangers of providing health care in conf lict noted
that “sometimes the level of violence aimed at health care workers—irrespective of how neutral they
are—means that providing humanitarian aid can become untenable.” The article cited what has become
a commonly used example of the consequences of the increasingly volatile and potentially “untenable”
circumstances of medical assistance in conf lict-affected countries: the August 2013 withdrawal of
MSF from Somalia after 22 years of operation in the country. During the two decades of operation, 16
staff members were killed, and several others were kidnapped or injured in attacks. According to the
Aid Worker Security Database (ASWD), since 1997, at least 161 aid workers were killed in Somalia.
Some of these certainly worked with medical organizations, including MSF, and some may have been
targeted for providing health care, but available information does not indicate that a specific relief
sector in Somalia was increasingly intentionally targeted.
Operating in war zones has always come with risks. Initially, attention focused on the general
risks associated with operating in conf lict-affected areas, such as being caught in the crossfire.
More recently this attention has shifted to targeted violence. When MSF reached its “limit” in
2013 and withdrew from Somalia, it was a strong symbol in the debate over the limits of what is
acceptable or tenable for humanitarian organizations providing assistance in war zones. But it is
not immediately clear that MSF’s decision to withdraw is representative of a wider trend in which
medical assistance, in par ticular, is being targeted.
Targeted attacks on humanitarian workers, including those providing medical assistance, have a
histor y as long as the modern humanitarian movement, which is commonly regarded as beginning
with the response to the war and famine in Biafra, Nigeria, in the 1960s. In 1969 three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) relief workers were killed when the Nigerian militar y
shot down an ICRC aircraft fully marked with the Red Cross emblem and car r ying relief aid to
Biafra. Many other medical workers have been targeted since then. In 1996, six ICRC workers were
shot dead while sleeping in a hospital in Chechnya—at the time, it was the bloodiest attack on aid
workers in the ICRC’s 130-year histor y. In 2001, six ICRC staff members were br utally killed, this
time in the Democratic Republic of Congo while traveling in two vehicles marked with the Red
Cross emblem. In 2004, five MSF staff members were killed in an ambush in Afghanistan.
In the past 40 years, the movement has expanded not just in the size of its personnel and assets but
also in scope, extending “its reach and ambitions into types of conf lict and crisis that were previously off-limits.” It is therefore perhaps not sur prising that the sheer numbers of attacks have also
increased. Yet recent headlines highlighting attacks on humanitarian health care workers in South
Sudan, Syria, Pakistan and Somalia suggest something new in the pattern of targeted violence.
While there is a scarcity of comprehensive data on this question, there are two sources we can turn
to for more insight: the ASWD and the ICRC-led Healthcare in Danger project.
The ASWD is one of the most commonly cited data sources in the discourse on attacks on humanitarians. The database records “major incidents,” defined as “killings, kidnappings and armed
attacks that result in serious injur y” affecting international and local staff of the United Nations
international and local nongovernmental organizations as well as the Red Cross/Crescent Movement. At first glance, the ASWD statistics appear to suppor t a global trend of rising security
incidents involving aid workers, with an annual average of 147 incidents in 2006 -2013, compared
with an annual average of 64 incidents in 2000-2005. However, the vast majority of the 2006 2013 incidents were concentrated in 10 countries, with the top three—Afghanistan, Somalia and
Sudan—accounting for more than 50 percent of all incidents during this period. Afghanistan is the
leader for most of the years, accounting for 30 percent of all incidents between 2006 and 2013 and
47 percent of all incidents in 2013 alone. The ASWD does not break down the data by function, so
looking for specific trends related to humanitarian health care providers from this dataset is difficult. But one thing is clear: It is more appropriate to speak about trends in a handful of specific
countries than a global trend.
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IS VIOLENCE RISING?

Given the localization of the trend, the question becomes, in countries where there is an increase
of violent incidents involving humanitarian medical personnel and assets, are they being specifically targeted because they are providing medical services? Moreover, are there common patterns
to be found in the motivations for or drivers of these attacks? For example, there does appear to be
a trend targeting polio vaccination workers in some countries, par ticularly Pakistan, Nigeria and
Afghanistan. The motivations for these attacks can var y, however, with examples including accusations that polio workers are U.S. spies, the use of attacks against vaccination campaigns to gain
or increase visibility and beliefs in some communities that vaccination effor ts are actually par t
of a sterilization campaign. Though these motivations are context-specific, they can be broadly
captured under a common theme: politicization.
In the past decade, there has been a shift away from debates emphasizing the impact of aid on
politics to that of politics on aid. But while “politicization” is commonly bandied about as a main
cause of the supposedly increasing vulnerability of assistance in times of conf lict, including medical assistance, it too is not a new development. Like incidents of violence, politicization spans the
histor y of the modern humanitarian movement. So what, if anything, has changed?
OLD STORY, NEW NUANCE
The shooting down of the ICRC plane in 1969, noted above, was in par t the result of the role
that humanitarian aid played in sustaining the separatist regime in Biafra and the Nigerian government’s response. Discussions around the political effects of humanitarian assistance—direct,
indirect, intended and unintended—at first emerged quietly following the Biafra War and later exploded in the wake of crises such as Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s with the widespread
recognition that aid could become entangled in the dynamics of war.
The impact of humanitarian assistance on political groups and str uctures or the politicization of
aid, in which assistance is deliberately manipulated to serve political pur poses, can take many
forms. For example, aid may serve as a financial resource for the state or armed nonstate actors
to sustain or fuel conf lict. It may legitimize armed nonstate actors as an unintended consequence
of access negotiations or providing services in areas under their control. Or political actors may
deliberately and directly co-opt humanitarian action, such as by using humanitarian assistance as
a reward for peacebuilding or strategically in militar y campaigns, including relying on or preventing access to assistance.
Syria and Somalia have both recently appeared in headlines citing the increased vulnerability of
medical assistance in conf lict. Somalia has a 40-year legacy of humanitarian politics, while Syria
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Aiming to raise awareness of how medical assistance is targeted in conf lict-affected countries,
the Health Care in Danger project, spanning 2011-2015, collects information on incidents involving the “use or threat of violence against health care personnel, the wounded and the sick, health
care facilities and medical vehicles.” Incidents are defined more broadly in this study, which also
includes local health care workers in addition to those working for the institutions covered by the
ASWD. However, the findings still ref lect the principal observation above—that the majority of
incidents take place in a handful of countries. For example, in 2012, the study recorded 921 violent
incidents affecting health care in 22 countries; these incidents were concentrated in eight countries that each recorded 40 or more incidents. Unfor tunately, the Health Care in Danger study does
not name the countries, but considering news coverage of incidents and available public data it
would be reasonable to assume that there is some overlap with the ASWD top 10. The ICRC study
also indicates variation by countr y as to the per petrators of these attacks. For example, in one
countr y, 80 percent of the incidents were repor ted as per petrated by state security forces, while in
another, armed nonstate actors were repor tedly responsible for 52 percent of the incidents. Other
incidents involve individuals, such as relatives unhappy with patient treatment, and international
militar y or police, while still others involve multiple per petrators or lack sufficient information
to attribute responsibility.

In Syria, the role of medical assistance in militar y strategy has come front and center since the
war broke out in 2011. The countr y is a recent addition (2012) to the ASWD top-10 list, yet news
repor ts tell us that among the dead are ambulance crew volunteers, doctors and, as of Januar y
2014, 34 Syrian Arab Red Crescent volunteers. In September 2013, the U.N. Human Rights Council
published a repor t raising alarm at the “deliberate targeting of hospitals, medical personnel and
transpor ts, the denial of access to medical care and ill-treatment of the sick and wounded.” The
repor t continued, “The denial of medical care as a weapon of war is a distinct and chilling reality of the war in Syria.” That it is “chilling” is by no means in question, but is it new? Or more
specifically, does it represent a new pattern in conf lict modalities?
The case of Somalia, where over the decades assistance has been entangled in the politics of the
conf lict in almost ever y conceivable way, including militar y strategies, suggests the answer is no.
For example, since the 1980s, refugee camps have served as recr uiting grounds for the government and armed nonstate actors, and warlords and other armed actors have benefitted from—and
sometimes consciously sought out—the financial suppor t and legitimacy afforded as an unintended
consequence of humanitarian aid. More recently, access to medical assistance has formed par t of
the militar y strategy of the principal armed nonstate actor in the conf lict, al-Shabab. It has been
repor ted that al-Shabab made an effor t to have international NGOs working in the health sector
operate in areas under its control in order “to guarantee that its wounded fighters would get adequate treatment.”
The significance of this medical suppor t did not go unnoticed by either Somalis or international
observers. And while some NGOs providing medical assistance were expelled from Shabab-controlled areas following accusations of spying for the U.S., other medical humanitarian agencies remained. One of those organizations was MSF, which has been relatively open about its operations
in Shabab-controlled areas. Speaking in 2010 about an MSF-suppor ted hospital in the capital,
Mogadishu, an MSF spokesperson remarked how “from the rebels’ point of view, it was in their
interest to suppor t assistance for their wounded and displaced populations and to encourage the
aid organizations to attest to the crimes by the Ethiopian army with the suppor t of the government
militias. . . . We are sometimes seen by some political players, the African Union mission officers,
for example, as the opposition’s war surgeons.”
Some actors were repor tedly fr ustrated by the suppor t they perceived MSF to be providing to
al-Shabab, which may have made the organization more vulnerable to attack. Yet although the
Mogadishu hospital mentioned above was hit by gunfire and shelling in 2012, the incident came
amid renewed fighting in the capital; available evidence does not suggest the hospital or health
care workers were specifically singled out. Medical personnel and facilities may have been subject
to violent threats and attacks during the course of the conf lict, but violent targeting of medical
staff and facilities because of the medical services they provided does not appear to have formed
an explicit par t of the militar y strategy—and cer tainly not to the extent witnessed in Syria.
When MSF pulled out of Somalia in 2013, the decision was based on the culmination of events
over several years as well as recent incidents. One of those recent incidents was the 2011 killing
of two staff in Mogadishu. While in no way tr ying to diminish the seriousness of this incident,
the killing was repor tedly motivated by a human resource grievance, not because of the medical
services the staff were providing.
NEW COSTS OF CONFLICT
While both Syria and Somalia provide evidence of medical assistance being instr umentalized in
war, the cases offer different answers to the question of whether there is an increasing vulnerability for humanitarian health care workers and the assistance they provide. In Syria the answer
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is a recent entrant into the fray. Yet they are both examples of how medical assistance can be
politicized and consciously made par t of militar y strategy.

But what if we look at the issue another way—rather than rising risks to health workers, examining
instead the rising costs for the conf lict-affected populations’ health in these countries. That is, the
perceived rise in threats to health workers may be a symptom of a larger phenomenon, that of the
rising health costs of conf lict overall, which leave health systems par ticularly damaged.
Chronic conf lict and state failure in Somalia, and the accompanying political, economic, social
and security challenges, have left the countr y with 0.4 doctors for 10,000 inhabitants—compared
with an average of 28.7 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants for the five permanent members of the U.N.
Security Council. In the year before MSF pulled out of Somalia, the organization had provided
more than 624,000 medical consultations, admitted 41,100 patients to hospitals, cared for 30,090
malnourished children, vaccinated 58,620 people and delivered 7,300 babies. Other NGOs have
tried to fill the void left by the organization’s withdrawal. But in a countr y where MSF had become
one of the main health care providers, it is a big role to fill.
We see similar figures for health care workers in some of the other ASWD top contenders, most
of which are also countries affected by chronic conf lict: In Afghanistan there are 1.9 doctors per
10,000 inhabitants, while in Sudan there are 2.8. While the duration of the conf lict does not match
that of Afghanistan or Somalia, the public health sector in Syria already lies in r ubble. Conf lict
has a devastating effect on the health of a population. Contemporar y conf licts include battlerelated deaths and injuries, as Syria has illustrated with estimates of more than 140,000 civilians
killed to date. But they also include extensive indirect effects of war on health, which can lead
to death tolls in the millions from disease, malnutrition and the inability to access medical care.
Humanitarian medical assistance in conf lict-affected countries provides vital assistance both for
battle-related injuries as well as the indirect health effects stemming from the destr uction of
public health sector, epidemics accompanying mass population movements, and restricted or no
access to basic services such as water, to name only a few. A recent MSF study on health care in
the Democratic Republic of Congo observed, “Violence, or the threat of it, forces medical staff to
f lee and health facilities to suspend activities. Often, people in the affected areas have no other
health care providers to turn to—and it is those people who suffer most.” The inference from the
debate on violence against health care workers and the politicization of humanitarian medical assistance is that the health of conf lict-affected populations is becoming more vulnerable, and that
people are suffering more, as a result.
A lesson from an earlier round of debate on humanitarian politics comes to mind here. When
the political effects of aid came under heavy scr utiny in the 1990s, case studies from Somalia,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sudan were heavily inf luential in what became a
generalized discussion on how aid fueled conf lict. That aid has unintended effects and could fuel
conf lict was not and has not been disputed. However, arguably, when taking into consideration the
many factors that fuel and inf luence conf lict, the significance of aid varies extensively between
contexts. The “new or thodoxy” of aid fueling war may have been too reliant on a generalization
based on extreme or outlying cases.
Within the cur rent discourse on the risks to health care in conf lict, not only is there a strong
focus on a specific set of countries, but much of the available information on so-called new trends
focuses on the health care providers rather than a thorough analysis of the effects violence has
on affected populations. Understanding context-specific patterns of violence against medical assistance is impor tant, and oppor tunities should not be missed to identify and learn lessons that
could diminish these attacks. But in terms of global trends, the focus on allegedly growing attacks
on medical assistance or changes in how it is politically instr umentalized seems to be misplaced.
The evidence suggests potentially more impor tant questions: Are the effects of conf lict on health
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is clearly yes. In Somalia, it is much less clear. These admittedly brief examples reinforce the need
to pause before concluding there is a global shift underway in the risks to health care providers
in conf lict.

Dr. Hannah Vaughan-Lee has more than 10 years experience working on conf lict- af fected countries with humanitarian, human rights and development organizations. She holds a Ph. D. in
Development Studies focusing on the politics of aid. Previous articles on aid worker securit y and
politicization include “Risks and Compromises for Aid Workers: When is Enough, Enough?” and
“Humanitarian Space in Somalia: A Scare Commodit y.”
Photo: Haitians receiving cholera treatment, L’Estere, Haiti, Oct. 26, 2010 (U. N. photo by Sophia
Paris).
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care greater than they once were? And why? These are difficult questions, and understanding what
inf luences the health of a population is a complex endeavor. But the answers may provide greater
insight into the changing vulnerabilities of health in conf lict. □
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UNSAFE SPACES: TRENDS AND
CHALLENGES IN GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE

BY JANIE LEATHERMAN AND NADEZDA
GRIFFIN
There is not sufficient evidence on the use of sexual violence in conf lict to determine whether
it is increasing or decreasing in prevalence or institutionalization. However, evidence indicates
it is widespread. Conf lict-related gendered violence can range from a tool of economic exploitation, oppression and violence, especially during conf licts, disasters and their aftermath, to the
systematic use of sexual violence as a strategy in armed conf lict. Gender-based violence (GBV)
is defined in humanitarian contexts as “an umbrella term for any harmful act that is per petrated
against a person’s will, and that is based on socially ascribed (gender) differences between males
and females.”
Many conf licts encompass different formsof GBV, the escalation of which is fueled by pre-existing
gender inequalities, discrimination, abuse and lack of respect of human rights. Despite common
assumptions, gendered violence in conf lict is not limited to women and girls, but can also target
men and boys, as well as persons of all ages. There is evidence of widespread use of sexual violence in contemporar y conf licts, including in Somalia, Mali, Sudan, Syria, Colombia, Guatemala
and Honduras, and including against men, for example in Syria and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Despite the prevalence of sexual violence in conf lict today, we are no longer living in an era of silence and impunity. This changed definitively when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Cour t (ICC) came into force in 2002. Building on previous international criminal tribunals, the
ICC expands international law on war crimes and crimes against humanity to encompass forms of
sexual violence such as rape, sexual slaver y, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced
sterilization, and also to consider sexual violence as an element of genocide. These developments
have challenged prevailing norms that treated sexual violence in warfare as a corollar y to looting,
in which the woman was seen as the proper ty of another man, rather than in terms of her own
bodily integrity and human dignity.
Never theless, the risks of sexual violence are also shifting along with changes in the patterns
of conf lict and the spaces in which it takes place. This requires new kinds of programming to
suppor t affected members of communities. Of par ticular note, refugee and displaced populations
are becoming more urban as opposed to r ural, while localized violence is also increasingly intertwined with crime and economic exploitation embedded in globalized networks. Climate change
and disaster also intersect with crime and conf lict to fur ther heighten risks.
CONFLICT TRENDS AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
Despite major shifts in the global patterns of warfare over the past centur y, more than 1.5 billion
people cur rently live in areas affected by state fragility from the intersections of violence, crime
and conf lict. Contemporar y conf licts are also internationalized through the blur ring of illicit and
licit economies, or what Carolyn Nordstrom calls the “extralegal” movement of goods and people.
As Reece Jones has documented in “Border Walls,” states are increasingly walling up their borders
to fur ther militarize control of extralegal activity—for pur poses of both profit and interdiction—
and as par t of their strategies to limit asylum seekers and facilitate depor tation.
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These shifts create new spaces for GBV that need to be addressed. For example, the shift of
refugee populations from r ural camps to urban settings introduces different security and safety
challenges. In camp settings, women refugees and displaced persons face such risks as limited
camp monitoring for security; ill-considered placement of latrines along with lack of lighting and
locks; absence of male family or community members to provide protection; and risks of sexual
assault while collecting firewood or selling goods at the local market, among others. Along with
rape by gangs, rebel groups, government armed forces, local police or even humanitarian workers,
survival sex poses some of the greatest gendered risks. Indeed, some women refugees in Mafraq,
Jordan, who had f led Syria indicated that they knew of cases where sex had to be exchanged for
aid. Humanitarian programming should provide equal access to economic oppor tunities for men
and women, and ensure safety consistent with the principle of “do no harm.” But for women, these
oppor tunities may in fact be limited.
In urban settings, the displaced are often unregistered and undocumented refugees who lack rights
and face persecution. While they may attempt to blend into the local setting, refugees face gendered risks from inadequate shelter, physical insecurity and exploitation in informal markets—for
women especially in domestic labor or prostitution. In urban settings and post-disaster contexts,
vulnerabilities to human and sex trafficking increase, including for children, especially as displacement destroys livelihoods and people are forced to find new means to suppor t their families.
Conf licts unfold both over time and space. The post-Cold War approach to conf lict interventions
has been driven by a phase model of conf lict, with programming geared to challenges arising over
a timeline defined as pre-crisis, crisis and stabilization/recover y—a framework clearly ar ticulated,
for example, in the 2010 “Handbook for Coordinating Gender-based Violence Interventions in
Humanitarian Settings.” However, local conf licts are often linked to global political economies of
violence. A spatial analysis can help GBV programming by illustrating the patterns and scale of
these risks and enabling factors, determining where these occur in the daily lives and livelihoods
of those most vulnerable and identifying options to enhance gendered safety.
For example, displaced populations settling in camps for refugees or the internally displaced
integrating into an urban environment may find themselves in less of a “community” context than
they would in traditional villages. While this makes it possible to repor t cases of GBV in a more
anonymous way, the lack of community also makes it more difficult to encourage local suppor t and
incor porate local and culturally accepted practices into healing GBV-related trauma. Therefore,
programs may consider creating communities of survivors and those working with them to enable
suppor t and long-term economic oppor tunities, rather than relying on geographically oriented
communities as a suppor t str ucture. Survival Girls, a theater group for Congolese girls aged 17-22
in Nairobi’s slum of Kangemi, is a safe space that serves such pur poses.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS A CONFLICT WEAPON
Sexual violence is an affront to humanity, ripping apar t bodies, families and communities. The impact of any possible form of assistance to survivors pales in contrast to the trail of destr uction left
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These developments in state border practices have to be seen against the backdrop of historic
highs in numbers of displaced people along with four related trends. First, the balance of refugees
is shifting from r ural camp settings to urban locations. Second, threats of human displacement
from climate change are rising, with related potential for environmentally driven conf licts around
the world and elevated gendered vulnerabilities. At the same time, rapid urbanization is also projected to greatly enhance exposure to disaster risks. Third, the interface between migration and
humanitarian crises is producing “mixed migration.” And four th, the numbers of stateless people
are high—the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees identified 3.5 million stateless persons in 64 countries in 2012, but estimates that there may be over 12 million stateless worldwide.
All these trends heighten the vulnerability of displaced populations, including through the rising
numbers of unaccompanied minors, to the risks of GBV and exploitation.

Historically, strong taboos have created a veil of silence about the role of sexual violence in
peacetime and war. The global women’s movement that gained momentum in the 1990s began to
empower women to overcome this silencing. As evidenced by key United Nations Security Council
resolutions such as 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2012)
and 2122 (2013), along with other U.N. repor ts, such as the 2012 U.N. secretar y-general’s repor t
on conf lict-related sexual violence, most of the attention has focused on violence against women
and girls. Yet male victimization has been documented in a vast ar ray of conf licts, most recently
in Syria, even if the extent of it is only slowly coming to light.
Sexual violence is a “r unaway” norm that intensifies social harm through many overlapping and
egregious subversive strategies and practices. It is also a pervasive element of conf lict, posing risks
through all phases of conf lict. Risks for women and children’s safety in the aftermath of conf lict
remain high, too, because of the breakdown of social norms, a climate of impunity, a culture of
violence against women in both domestic and public spheres, a collapse of law and public authority
and the resulting lack of accountability, increased banditr y and criminality, and retribution.
Sexual violence is efficient because it is a cheap, practically inexhaustible weapon that can be
used to simultaneously cross numerous thresholds of violence. It is also a powerful weapon for
cultural reasons related to its force as a taboo violation. Sexual violence encompasses atrocities
that subver t the traditional social order and elevate hor ror.
There are at least four elements that help explain the par ticular viciousness of sexual violence. The
first aspect concerns the egregious forms or acts of violence that sexual assaults entail. As more
thresholds are broken, it seems that per petrators pursue increasingly depraved forms of sexual
violence and combinations of them in an attempt to continuously escalate the threat.
A second aspect of sexual violence as a r unaway norm concerns the targets of the violence, especially victims with special standing in society, such as pregnant women, the elderly, children,
mothers, fathers, grandparents, doctors, nurses, teachers and religious leaders. A third element
that propels the r unaway normative character of sexual violence concerns the use of forced agency,
such as children who are compelled to commit acts of sexual violence, and child soldiers—many
of whom may have themselves been abducted—who are dr ugged or indoctrinated to car r y out war
crimes and crimes against humanity.
A four th characteristic that fuels sexual violence as a r unaway norm concerns the place where it is
committed, which is almost always significant in its own way. This point also underscores the impor tance of understanding the spatiality of sexual violence in conf lict as perhaps an incomparable
weapon—and a force multiplier—for the production of unsafe space. It is used to threaten communities and drive community members to f lee violence, while placing them at new risk. This in
turn enables opposing armed groups to capture the abandoned ter ritor y and assets, control access
to them and use displaced and vulnerable populations for forced labor—including for smuggling
arms, dr ug production and trafficking, mining and other activities.
Sexual violence in conf licts occurs in all manner of locations, including in homes, gardens and
fields, as well as at work and in many places considered safe havens, such as hospitals, clinics,
schools and religious sites. It also occurs in refugee or internally displaced person camps. In
many instances, sexual violence in armed conf lict appears not to be systematically organized at
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in the wake of sexual violence. Sexual violence casts a long shadow over its victims—whether men,
women, war or phans, rape babies or child soldiers—through physical and psychological trauma and
social mechanisms of exclusion, shame, stigmatization and blame. Reverberations endure through
subsequent generations by means of the transmission of trauma, the long arc of war memories and
the shunning and marginalization of affected families and community members. In conf licts such
as the genocide in Rwanda and the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, rape has been used as a weapon of
war to block as much as possible any future for the enemy.

CURRENT AND FUTURE POLICY DIRECTIONS
The programs addressing GBV-related issues typically involve coordination, response and, to some
extent, attempts at prevention. Such programs are integrated or addressed through a number of sectors, including health, r ule of law, food security and livelihoods, education and so on. Stakeholders
in the area of GBV-related issues range from international organizations such as the U.N. Security
Council, the International Criminal Cour t, the U.N. Depar tment of Peacekeeping Operations and
the U.N. Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conf lict, to regional organizations, such
as the African Union, governments—including relevant ministries, such as for health—and to
regional and local municipalities and community-based organizations.
The United Nations Children Fund and the United Nations Populations Fund are the lead agencies
for the GBV area of responsibility within the interagency Global Protection Cluster, while U.N.
Women spearheads international initiatives on women, peace and security, gender equality and
development work. Governments have elaborated national action plans (NAPs) on women, peace
and security, many of which the Network of Women Peacebuilders monitors and repor ts on in its
annual publication “Women Count.” NAPs are also tracked on Peace Women. In addition, some
countries have developed special programming on violence against women. The United States,
for example, has launched a program under the Secretar y of State’s Office of Global Women’s
Issues, and the British government has done so under its Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative.
International nongovernmental organizations working in the field of GBV include agencies such
as the International Rescue Committee, the American Refugee Committee, Save the Children,
International Medical Cor ps, Oxfam, Handicap International and Plan International.
As set for th by the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) guidelines, GBV programs typically
focus on the needs of the survivor, providing medical, psychosocial, legal, economic and social
resources. In order to reduce GBV cases, most programs include advocacy and training effor ts,
thus encouraging governments to create adequate GBV-related policies, educating communities
about the cases occur ring in their localities and sharing the impact on the victims in hopes of
reducing the number of cases. Yet the existing stigma when it comes to repor ting GBV often impedes those effor ts. For instance, a 2013 Interagency Assessment repor t on child protection among
Syrian refugees in Jordan indicates that there is ver y limited awareness about services available to
victims of GBV. It is generally accepted that GBV cases are under repor ted, while the full scale of
it is unknown. According to the same repor t, 83 percent of those asked were not aware of services
offered in their communities.
Meanwhile, some countries do have policies to combat GBV and are aware of a multitude of GBV
cases, but the enforcement of those policies remains a challenge. Victims or their families may
repor t GBV cases in a variety of ways—such as through family, medical professionals or law enforcement—but in a number of instances the victim is fur ther victimized by the resulting process.
For example, a rape victim may be forced to mar r y the per petrator, blamed for the violence that
occur red or forced to remain in mar riage for the sake of family stability. In addition to widespread
problems with impunity, the 2012 “Women Count” repor t also revealed a lack of health care services and capacity and a lack of gender-sensitive resources for the police and judicial systems.
As data from numerous repor ts on the substantial numbers of sexual violence victims among
men and boys ref lect—including recent repor ts from Syria—there is also space for adjusting interventions to develop awareness of physical symptoms of sexual assault of male victims and to
destigmatize the repor ting of such violations. There also need to be medical and psychosocial
programs and longer-term economic solutions to suppor t men and aid them in recover y, including
within family and community suppor t str uctures. Prevention, monitoring and advocacy programs
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the highest levels nor limited to individual acts of ter ror. Rather, it occurs somewhere along such
a continuum as par t of local strategies of control, exploitation and domination, such as repor ts
suggest is the case in Syria.

A range of programs consider GBV in conjunction with the safe space issue. In considering shelter
or constr uction programs, these approaches may involve building the camp so that families are
given relative privacy and so that single, widowed or separated women are not exposed to greater
risk when they have to take on more responsibilities for the household and—when possible—for
generating income. In other instances, projects may include improving the safety of the actual
shelters. Similarly, the programs that focus on economic strengthening, including those with various training programs, income-generation activities, cash transfers, grants, agricultural development and so on, may consider GBV problematic in the design and implementation of those projects,
while other projects specifically target GBV survivors. The failure to do so ref lects widely held
assumptions that economic recover y and infrastr ucture are gender-neutral, that is, that women and
men will benefit equally, though that is rarely the case.
There are many large international nonprofit organizations leading GBV programs around the
world in conf lict, post-conf lict or relative peace environments. To date, there is no complete
overview of the scale of such programs, though more countr y-level information may be available
via the protection cluster in the locations where it is established. However, this overview often
does not take into consideration a substantial number of local, community initiatives and organizations that often have limited visibility and funding and yet provide impor tant services to women
and girls in those communities. For instance, a Southern Sudanese NGO, Confident Children out
of Conf lict (CCC), provides a safe space for girls that are at high risk of exploitation and abuse,
including GBV. CCC provides a safe place to stay along with access to basic education and vocational training. The binational Kino Border Initiative in Nogales, Arizona, and Nogales in the state
of Sonora, Mexico, similarly provides safe space in a region of violent border risks for migrants
depor ted from the United States, including a safe house for women f leeing domestic and dr ugrelated violence from Central America and Mexico.
While the field of GBV programming in humanitarian emergencies has developed rapidly over
the past decade within and across many sectors, methods of evaluating effectiveness and evidence
of learning from good practices are emerging more slowly. Such learning has been propelled
by organizations such as The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in
Humanitarian Action, founded in 1997, and DARA, founded in 2003, which both aim to improve
quality and effectiveness of humanitarian action. Nonetheless, in the present context it is difficult
to pinpoint to what extent the cur rently implemented programs would help prevent gender-based
violence. Moreover, given the number of potentially under repor ted cases it is hard to identify the
depth of the problem, and yet making assistance available is critical in emergencies. However, going forward, integrating GBV programs into the community is essential in preventing GBV cases.
Eventually, community-based effor ts can be fur ther developed into larger civil society impacts
with the involvement of women’s organizations for effective monitoring, and also mobilizing and
advocating for policy implementation.
To such ends, a key initiative is the 2014 pilot of revisions to the 2005 IASC Guidelines, which
will be followed by feedback and fur ther refinement. These revisions will stress the impor tance
of multifaceted programing on GBV rather than a focus on sexual violence in emergencies, cover
natural disasters along with conf lict settings, give guidance to both shor t-term programming to
improve protection as well as interventions for longer-term str uctural changes to eliminate GBV,
and include accountability mechanisms. Guidance documents on GBV programming may benefit
from fur ther categorizing different forms of violence, target groups, contexts and relevant responses to foster the exchange of lessons learned.
Nonetheless, among the challenges for moving forward is the lack of consensus on defining and applying gender-based violence concepts. A second issue concerns new demands for programming to
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need also to consider the risk factors and causes that predispose men and boys to sexual violence
in contemporar y conf licts, including in the context of state fragility and the linkages between
conf lict and crime.

There are also different challenges for assessing success or failure in risk prevention or mitigation
versus outcomes of GBV programing to assist survivors. Prevention strategies are more complex,
less tangible and more difficult to measure, especially strategies that target str uctural causes of
violence, such as programming to address discrimination against women or develop the r ule of law
encompassing women’s rights. The impact of these strategies on social transformation is long-term
and complex. In addition, it is difficult to prove counterfactuals, for instance that a par ticular
preventive measure—such as lighting for latrines in refugees camps to provide greater protection
for women—aver ted specific outcomes, such as a cer tain number of rapes. In contrast, response
programs can tabulate numbers of persons given medical care, food, water, shelter and so on.
GBV is a widespread “r unaway” norm that operates both temporally and spatially. Though no
longer abetted by silence and impunity, it is in some ways adapting along with shifts in conf lict
itself. Our effor ts to respond to it, and prevent it, must do so as well. □
Dr. Janie Leatherman is a professor of politics and International studies at Fairf ield Universit y,
and has served as a consultant on peace and conf lict early warning and prevention, and humanitarian education. Her recent publications include “Sexual Violence and Armed Conf lict” (Polit y
2011), “A Safe Space” (Fairf ield Magazine 2013), and “Violencia Sexual, Guerra Globalizada y
el Colapso de L os Espacios Seguros” (Politai 2012).
Nadezda Grif f in is a humanitarian and development consultant with more than 10 years of experience in operations and logistics management, most recently with Action Against Hunger.
Photo: A clinic for vicitims of gender-baseded violence in Z ambia, Nov. 27, 2012 (U. K. Department for International Development photo).
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suppor t a wider range of survivors, such as men and boys; gay, lesbian and transgendered people;
and the disabled. A third set of challenges arises from changing contexts, such as risks in urban
versus r ural settings or conf lict versus disaster response and, increasingly, their intersections.
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